Isaac’s Storm: A Man, a Time, and the Deadliest Hurricane in History A Man, a Time, and the Deadliest Hurricane in HistoryWorldCat • LibraryThing • Google Books • BookFinder
At the turn of the twentieth century, scientific weather forecasting was in its infancy. The U.S. Weather Bureau, then about twenty years old, did not have the benefit of large-scale observation tools like satellites or Doppler radar. Instead, the Bureau’s forecasters — a handful of men in Washington, D.C. — relied on weather data collected by observers stationed throughout the country. This system allowed large storms to be tracked over land, but could not track those over the open ocean. This inability, coupled with a very poor understanding of hurricanes and the Bureau’s institutional arrogance, led to complete unpreparedness for one of this country’s worst weather-related disasters.
During the first week of September, 1900, a tropical storm passed just north of Cuba, drenching the island in rain. The Weather Bureau’s observers, in place on the island since the end of the Spanish-American War, predicted that the storm would move north, eventually passing over Florida and back into the Atlantic, without ever gaining much strength. In this, they differed from more experienced native Cuban meteorologists, who guessed that the storm would continue along its northwesterly course and become much more intense. The Bureau worked to silence the predictions of the Cubans, believing that their own guesses were far more accurate.
Isaac Cline, director of the Weather Bureau’s Galveston station, began to note peculiarities of wind and water on the seventh of September. But, he was lulled into a false sense of security by reports from the Bureau’s main office. He knew a storm was coming, but assumed it would be a minor one, and no cause for serious alarm. The city’s residents, with no reason to do otherwise, initially paid little attention to the approaching storm. When water began to rise over most of the island of Galveston, people started to worry. When high winds caused a downtown cafe to collapse, killing five men, people became truly afraid.
As the water continued to rise and more and more buildings succumbed to the wind and waves, the city’s residents tried to find the highest, most stable structures in which to take refuge. Some were forced to move from place to place as building after building became unstable. Even some of the most solidly built homes and businesses eventually collapsed under the hurricane’s onslaught, killing or injuring those inside. A quarter-mile long section of streetcar trestle, backed by tons of other debris, razed a path across the island, propelled by the storm surge.
When the first outsiders reached Galveston after the storm had passed, they were greeted with horrible sights — and smells. Thousands were dead, so many that survivors began simply burning corpses where they lay. The process of cleaning up was a long one; it took nearly a decade to rebuild the city (with stronger hurricane protection).
Erik Larson tells the story of the Galveston hurricane largely through the eyes of Isaac Cline, the city’s chief meteorologist. He compares Cline’s own memoirs with official records and accounts written by other survivors of the storm; these don’t always agree. Most pre-storm Galveston-related documents — including all of Cline’s papers — were destroyed by the hurricane. But, Larson does an admirable job of piecing together details from what did survive.
Sometimes though, in the pursuit of a compelling narrative, he provides a dubious level of detail regarding people’s thoughts, words, or actions. I had the same complaint about Larson’s The Devil in the White City, a book about the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago and the serial killer known as Dr. H. H. Holmes. Larson makes up for this (in my eyes, at least) with a wealth of more verifiable information. He provides accounts of people outside Galveston who experienced the storm and those of volunteers who helped to clean up the city, along with a great deal of weather-related historical context.
This book was published before Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, and I read it before Hurricane Ike defeated Galveston’s extra defenses and wreaked havoc on the city again. It perhaps should have served as a reminder of the awesome power of the weather and the danger of the complacency of many some coastal communities.

Patricia Atkinson Wells
April 6, 2009 at 3:44 pmBeautifully written, child of mine!
Dave
April 6, 2009 at 11:17 pmThanks!
New Orleans Ladder
April 7, 2009 at 9:04 amHi Dave,
yes, beautifully written but for one view I would like to see you change:
1) Hurricane Katrina missed New Orleans by nearly 50 miles.
2) New Orleans was devastated by the US Army Corps of Engineers, when their levees failed in nearly 50 locations due to substandard design, building and maintenance by the USACE.
This reality still matters to the survivors of that negligence like me, but particularly more so to the 1400+ and their families lost souls of that man made disaster.
Your tag of “complacency of coastal communities” is a grotesque misnomer easily, quickly employed by drive-by media about New Orleans, despite the fact that New Orleans is neither a coastal city (as Galveston) or responsible for that man-made distaster of August 29th, 2005.
I know all that sounds so hard and my apologies for it, but not the heart of the matter. I will never apologize for horror. And I always try to correct this myth of the devastation of New Orleans and our damn’nation at the hands of the Exquisite Corps of Engineers.
All that said (HA!) I do enjoy your post. We stayed up through the night with Ike. Can’t help it. Heavy Weather does that to me, probably always will.
Here is a great local group to check out on this never ending story: http://levees.org/
Please watch that movie there about Katrina Myths.
Thank youz,
Editilla~New Orleans Ladder
Dad
April 7, 2009 at 9:36 amDitto from Dad! You should seriously think about trying to write reviews for a print publication.
Dave
April 7, 2009 at 12:18 pmHi Bruce, thanks for your comments. Allow me to respond:
I don’t actually say that Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans dead-on. And, I’m not about to get into a discussion of who to blame for the damage to New Orleans — I’ve never lived in the city, and I’m not an engineer. However, I think that it is entirely untrue to say that the Army Corps of Engineers devastated New Orleans. Perhaps the case can be made that the failure of their structures magnified the damage, but the fact remains that the hurricane was ultimately responsible; the levees didn’t fail on a sunny day. Plus. if (as you contend) the levees themselves were inadequate prior to Katrina, that points to complacency on a number of levels.
I’m willing to change the word ‘many’ to ‘some’ in my statement about coastal communities, but I think you’re reading too much specificity into what I said. I was making a generalization about coastal communities — I saw the aftermath of various hurricanes in southern Florida, Pensacola, and Mobile. I’ve seen plenty of homes built on or near beaches in the gulf with seemingly little to no thought about what a strong storm would do to them. These are the sorts of communities I was referring to.